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On the referendum day these were last minute decisions that most probably turned the tide in favour
of the Leave camp. In this article Thomas Milic and Uwe Serdült draw up an analogy of the
June 23rd vote between the referendum votes on the EU that took place in Switzerland over
the past couple of years. They argue that would the Brits be Swiss, they would have voted
for an exit as well.
Since 1970 there have been more than 50 referendum votes on Europe. [1] However, a vote
on leaving the EU has been very rare. Thus, it was not surprising to see that public opinion
was ‘measured’ meticulously in the run up to the vote on 23 June 2016. Starting in
September 2015 one opinion poll after the other was published – pollsters ruled supreme in
the land of Her Majesty. In contrast to Switzerland, which usually only has two, there were so
many pre-election polls that several news outlets came up with aggregate polls, trying to
offer a more precise grasp on the voters’ intentions. In the last two weeks heading into the
vote they all displayed the same pattern: the opinion was shifting to “Leave”, notwithstanding
a short dip after the tragic death of MP Jo Cox. Such public opinion dynamic in the late
stage of a campaign came as a surprise – not only to many British pundits, but also to the
observers of the UK political life abroad. Their surprise was so great, beacuse it had
been generally assumed that in the end the undecided voters would lean towards the status
quo – true to the motto: “When in doubt, vote no”.
But how much of a surprise was it really? Not a tremendous one if one takes a closer look at
the Swiss referendum campaigns on the issue of Europe. The Swiss are rather familiar with such highly
controversial votes and they are also familiar with the predicament of undecided voters in tight referendum races.
After all, the Swiss might have never won a football cup, but when it comes to national referenda they are the
unchallenged world champions.[2] We can therefore make use of the Swiss experience to draw insights on what
may have happened during the last few days before the Brexit vote.
For such a comparison we took a closer look at all Swiss plebiscites on Europe [3] over the last 25 years. However,
not all of them are equally well suited for our purposes. The first vote on the bilateral treaties between Switzerland
and Europe in the year 2000, for example, did not have an exit but only an entry character. On this occasion, the
Swiss citizens were not deciding on a “Swexit”, but rather voted on whether to agree to bilateral treaties with the
European Union or not. The two referendums on the extension of the free movement of people (one in 2005 and the
other one in 2009), the cooperation with Central-Eastern Europe (2006) and the Schengen/Dublin treaty (2005)
indeed had an exit character. A “No” would have put an end to the bilateral arrangements or at least seriously called
them into question. However, in these votes the purely “formal status quo logic”[4] contradicted the “substantial
status quo logic”. For the typical risk averse voter this type of configuration was certainly more challenging than the
Brexit referendum.
There, the logic was rather simple. Whoever was unhappy with the current state of European politics voted for the
exit (Leave), whoever wanted to leave everything as it is voted Remain. A comparable situation for a Swiss
referendum vote can be found for the vote on the popular initiative against mass immigration (February 9, 2014).
This vote had an exit character and the voters were well aware of that, as studies have shown[5]. Similar to the
Brexit case, this was also a vote for which both camps conducted a robust and fierce campaign. Note that the
initiative “against mass immigration” was accepted by 50.3% yes votes of citizens (turnout was 56.7%) and 14 ½
cantons in favour of it (out of 26). If one were to follow the same electoral logic for the UK, the Brexit vote actually
would not have passed as only two (namely England and Wales) of the four British constituent units voted to leave.
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In Switzerland the passing of constitutional changes and major treaties not only requires a simple popular majority,
but also a majority of the cantons.[6]
Geneva, Switzerland – Referendum Posters (2006)
The Undecided
How do the undecided, ambivalent and late deciders vote on European matters in Switzerland? First some theory:
from election research we can deduct two contrary scenarios. One of the schools of thought postulates that vote
intention increasingly moves towards the status quo the closer the polling day. The justification for such a behaviour
in general is in the first place risk aversion. Risk aversion affects voting behaviour the stronger the more uncertain
and uninformed the individual is. Late deciders, in turn, are oftentimes ambivalent. It is due to this ambivalence that
they leave their decision until the very last minute. If this assumption holds true, we should expect opinion dynamics
for European referendums to trend towards a status quo vote.
On the other hand, we know that the willingness to proclaim one’s point of view in an opinion poll depends on the
general climate of opinions. When you consider yourself to be in the minority, you are more reluctant to voice your
opinion (it is less socially desirable to do so). In general, one does not want to deviate from the masses. However,
once you don’t feel stigmatised, because of your opinion, and you realise that there are many likeminded people
around you, you express your own opinion freely and may – reinforced by opinion polls – influence others as well.
The dynamic of a spiral of silence, which initially suppressed the actual opinion of a majority, can thus break down
during the campaign. A prerequisite for this to happen is an intense campaign, especially from the camp taking the
presumed minority position. If this assumption holds true we should expect a strengthening of a minority position in
an ongoing campaign.
The Analysis
What can we observe in general regarding opinion formation during European referendums in Switzerland and
regarding our most similar case for a comparison, namely the “mass immigration initiative”? For this purpose, we
analysed the traditional post referendum VOX polls.[7] In order to analyse opinion dynamics during the referendum
campaign we used the (retrospective) question about the time point. For this survey question the respondents let us
know at which point in time they made up their minds. This should not to be confounded with the formal casting of
the vote, for example the time when the ballot was sent by post or dropped into a ballot box, but rather about the
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mental fixation on a certain decision.
We have to keep in mind that we have no knowledge whether the respondent changed his or her mind during the
referendum campaign, or how many times. We only know their answers about the point in time when respondents
took their final verdict. From this information we mapped the course of vote intention for each respective referendum
vote of the voters who were ready to decide. In parallel, we reconstructed the difficulty to decide according to the
point in time the decision was taken. This proportion corresponds to the bars in Graphs 2 and 3.
In Graph 1 we can note that the proportion of late deciding voters for European referendums in Switzerland is about
as high as in the Brexit polls: one week before the vote it is on average ten percent. In comparison to the other
referendum topics in Switzerland this proportion is low. The reason is that referendums on the European question
are a recurring issue in Switzerland. It is hence well known to citizens and many already have an opinion on the
issue.
Graph 1: Proportion of late deciders across Swiss EU referendums
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The percentage of respondents in the various surveys with a clear opinion from the outset fluctuates more.
Especially noteworthy is the fact that it was relatively low for the so called «referendum vote of the century» on the
European Economic Area Agreement (1992), then rose to about 60% and has lately been declining again. This
figure documents the fact that the bilateral treaties with the European Union were rather undisputed ten years ago,
but that they are increasingly coming into doubt. Furthermore, these values hint at an increased potential of
referendum campaigns to convince people. This is due to the proportion of the voters who stated that they were sure
about their opinions (and thus rather immune to any campaigning) has consistently dropped in the recent years.
Last but not least, the development of vote intention for European referendums in Switzerland is often very much in
sync with opinion formation during the Brexit campaign: it was not the advocates of the EU status quo who were
gaining ground towards the end but the sceptics and adversaries of the EU. The parallel with the Swiss experience
is particularly strong with our prime example vote, the initiative to stop “mass immigration” (see Graph 2). During the
campaign these were the proponents of the initiative to have immigration quotas who gained support, not their
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adversaries (meaning those in favour of bilateral arrangements). The referendums on the Schengen/Dublin treaty
and the extension of free moment in 2009 show a similar pattern. For the cooperation with Central-Eastern Europe,
the extension of free movement in 2005 and the bilateral treaties we can hardly recognise the pattern (see Graph 3).
However, we know that compared to their counter parts the anti-European party – the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) –
only invested very limited funds into these particular campaigns.[8] But as we mentioned earlier to break through the
spiral of silence effect one needs an intense referendum campaign. Moreover, the displayed graphs are a
convincing record of the fact that late deciding voters are having a much harder time making up their mind than the
ones deciding early on.
Graph 2: Proposed pattern for late deciders holds
Reading example for the initiative “against mass immigration”: Around 40 percent of those who were certain of their
vote intentions from the outset (“from the outset”) , voted in favour of the MEI. That proportion, however, gradually
grew the closer the voting day came. Besides, less than 20 percent of the early deciders (“from the outset”) reported
to have had difficulties making up their minds, while roughly half of the late deciders (“1-6 days”) had a hard time to
come to a voting decision.
Graph 3: Proposed pattern for late deciders does not hold
In
general, we can thus state that for Swiss referendums on questions relating to EU policy the theory of the spiral of
silence, or more precisely the fact that it gets broken up by noisy and intense campaigning, fits better with empirical
data than the status quo model. Moreover, it is also noteworthy that voters’ intentions did not change dramatically for
all the Swiss votes we checked. As we have seen, most voters have made up their minds rather early. Swiss voters
are highly familiar with foreign policy matters[9] and thus have persistent, highly stable opinions about it. A
spectacular change of minds is therefore highly unlikely in the Swiss case. That might be different in the UK, simply
because they have much less experience with referendum votes on Europe.
In short, based on what we know about the opinion making process in the run-up to the European referendums in
Switzerland, we can say: if it were the Swiss voting on the Brexit we would expect a Leave rather than a Remain
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vote. We actually boldly predicted that outcome in a Swiss news outlet one day before the vote. And it is what
happened.
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